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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
V. Case No. 950531-CA 
ROBERT G. JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPKTJANT'S BRIEF 
1. Jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Ann. 1953 §78-
2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
2c Statement of issues: 
Issue I: Whether the lower court's refusal to 
dismiss the information that violated defendant's right ,{to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" under the 
6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was reversible error. 
Standard of review: Whether conviction should be reversed or 
affirmed in face of violation of federally protected 
constitutional right is governed by federal law. State v. 
Genovesi
 r 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995) Federal law as derived 
from Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038 
(1962), "[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, 
that where the definition of an offense includes generic 
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge 
the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; 
1 
but it must state the species, - it must descend to 
particulars." 
Issue II: Whether the lower court erred as a matter 
of law to defendant's prejudice in its refusal to dismiss the 
proceedings on the ground and for the reason the term or 
phrase "investment contract" as contained in the statute under 
which defendant was charged was void for vagueness and 
therefore in violation of defendant's due process rights 
accorded him under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 
this issue is presented after the plaintiff sought to prove 
"an investment contract as that term is defined by case law" 
and defendant moved for dismissal on vagueness grounds. 
Standard of review: As in Issue I, above, federal law 
governs. The standard of review under federal law is as 
stated in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), 
"[w]hen a penal or criminal statute is involved no one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as 
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be 
informed as to what the state commands or forbids." 
Issue III: Whether the lower courts ruling on 
defendant's motion to dismiss on vagueness grounds, to-wit, 
that "the term * investment contract' is defined in case law, 
the 'law of the land', and assumed that the definition is 
2 
adopted by the Utah legislature in passing the legislation 
under which defendant is charged . . . [t]he meaning of 
* investment contract7 is not unconstitutionally vague and its 
meaning, as defined by the Howey and Accounts Payable 
decisions, shall be applied in the case at bar. This case 
shall proceed to trial," violates the separation of powers 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, § 1, Art. V. R. 1579-83. 
Standard of review: It is for the legislature, not the 
courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct. The 
determination of the elements of a crime are under our 
constitutional system, judgments which must be made 
exclusively by the legislature. State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 
683 (Utah 1977). R. 1633-34; 1618-22. 
Issue IV: Whether defendant's right to a fair trial 
was invaded and violated by the lower court's allowance of 
expert testimony, and its denial of defendant's motion in 
limine to exclude such testimony, that an investment contract 
was present in the transactions described in the evidence at 
trial. R. 2410 See Uptain v. Huntington Labr Inc., 723 P.2d 
1322 (Colo. 1986) holding that the objection was sufficiently 
preserve when it was raised in a motion in limine before 
trial, even though no contemporaneous objection was made when 
the evidence was admitted at trial. 
3 
Standard of review: The allowance of expert evidence on the 
issue of the existence of an investment contract invaded the 
prerogatives of the jury, Miller v. Florida,. 285 S. 2d 41 
(Florida App. 1973). The question of whether an investment 
contract was present is a question of law on which the opinion 
of witnesses was not competent. Queen v. Commonwealth, 434 
S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968); 31A Am.Jur.2d. "Expert and Opinion 
Evidence", §136 et seq., p. 143. 
Issue V: Whether jury instruction 27, objected to at 
R. 2619, that 
"[ujnder Utah law, the term "security" means any note, 
stock, evidence of indebtedness, or investment contract. In 
this regard, you are instructed that the term "investment 
contract" means: 
1. An investment of money, 2. In a comnon enterprise, 
3. Where the investor expects a profit, and 4. The profit is 
substantially derived from the efforts of another person,", 
constructively amends the accusatory pleadings, deprives the 
defendant of a preliminary hearing, 
violates defendant's right to a fair trial, and his right to 
due process of law under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. 
Standard of review: "Unless one has had a preliminary hearing 
4 
or has waived it, with the consent of the state, he may not be 
committed to the district court for trial upon a complaint 
charging one offense and then be charged and tried upon an 
information charging an offense other than or different from 
the offense charged in the complaint upon which the 
information is based, unless it is an included offense." 
State v. Leek. 39 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1934); State v. 
Sommers, 597 P. 2d 1346 (Utah 1979). A conviction must be 
reversed if the court7s instructions to the jury amend the 
information to enlarge the offense. Stirone v. United States, 
361 U.S. 212 (1960) The instruction fails to explain how the 
requirements as set forth therein as to an investment contract 
relate to the facts of the case [State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 
909 (Utah App. 1995)], and required the jury to agree on any 
one of four "securities" which four securities are distinct 
from each other and may reasonably be viewed as alternatives 
as to which the jury must return separate verdicts. Cf. Schad 
v. Arizona, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (1991). Jury instructions may not 
include an element of an offense if that element was not 
charged in the indictment." Hunter v. State of N.M.f 916 F.2d 
595 (10th Cir. 1990). The instruction describes and defines 
the elements of an investment contract under the Howey and 
Payable Accounting definitions and thereby violates the 
5 
separation of powers doctrine. State v. Gallion. 572 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1977)• 
Issue VI: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the securities 
violations charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Standard of review: The appellate court reviews the record de 
novo under the Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)] 
standard. Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878 (3th Cir. 1994). 
Issue VII: Whether the improper conduct on the part 
of the prosecutor in introducing the guilty plea of 
appellant's codefendant Blake Adams was overwhelmingly 
prejudicial and tainted the entire trial, severely impaired 
appellant's defense, denied appellant a fair trial in 
violation of the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, requiring the guilty verdict to be set aside and 
vacated. R. 2446. Standard of review: Manifest error exists 
when the error is plain and made to appear xon the face of the 
record and to the manifest prejudice of the accused.'" State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989); State v. Pilling. 875 
P.2d 604 (UtahApp. 1994), "'A finding by the court of plain 
error requires that the error be obvious and harmful." See 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 
6 
L.Ed. 790 (1949) and U.S. V. Kroh, 896 F.2nd 1524, 1532-34 
(8th Cir. 1990) holding that such evidence "was overwhelmingly 
prejudicial and tainted the entire trial" the only obvious 
inference was "if Blake Adams admitted guilt, the defendant 
must also be guilty." 
3* Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, 
etc,, are 
§61-1-13(17) (1983) '^Security' means any 
note: stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; 
evidence of indebtedness; certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement; collateral-trust 
certificate; preorganization certificate or 
subscription; transferable share;; investment 
contract; burial certificate or burial 
contract; voting-trust certificate; 
certificate of deposit for a security; 
certificate of interest of participation in an 
oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in 
payments out of production under such title or 
lease; or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a %security,' or 
any certificate or interest or participation 
in, temporary or interim certificate, receipt 
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoingo * Security7 does not include any 
insurance or endowment policy or annuity 
contract under which an insurance company 
promises to pay money in a lump sum or 
periodically for life at some specified 
period." 
Amend. V, U.S. Const. No person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or 
7 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Amend. 6, U.S. Const. In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Amend. XIV, §1, U.S. Const. All persons born 
or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
4. Statement of the case: (a) Nature of the case: By 
information defendant was charged with 13 counts alleging 
felony securities violations. R. 1-35. (b) Course of 
proceedings: Trial to a jury resulted in a conviction on all 
counts. (c) Disposition in the trial court: Defendant was 
sentenced to a prison term of 9 years. R. 2157-58. (d) 
8 
Statement of facts* mK~ information charges 6 counts <^€ 
securities fraud th^ sale of unreqistei--i 
secui : I t::i..es »• 
s e c u r i t i e s agent c o u n t s v/i *..**< • itorruaiion whiwi. .... 
this defendant alieqe the violations to involve i eourit1^ 
security/"1 K.»imi o, c The &LaUut f b^A 
19b ,L ** : - ! or^-M-Ies that ' ! 
i l t t - . : - ' 
generic reference to an entile group ' to,.k! m e a securities 
enumerated in the subsection after - * mcauo. 
count of the information P^^iv net.
 iV anguaa** < ^ 
statute9 to-wit, security. an, .-a* • 
parti ci iJ ari zati on, e g • \ :?1" -u 
after the wo:i : d "means" I i :t . ^ u u , . *a.- .* . ^  v 
tr i al , defendant moved the 1 nwpr <-urt \ r^ «-. rder dismissing 
ts.* 
defendant haa nor. receiver n quate mtice >i * J\ - r\*-
many securities enumerator ^ * n*> st^t-nte »**?- intent" 
the t* investment control 1 *ne accus 
9 
Defendant then moved the lower court for an order 
dismissing the proceedings on U.S. Constitutional Due Process 
grounds contending that because the term investment contract 
was not defined in the statute it was void for vagueness and 
would not support the charges made against defendant. This 
motion was also denied the lower court holding that it had the 
right and duty to interpret the statute and did so by 
employing the definition of investment contract contained in 
the U.S. Supreme Court Howey decision, and the Utah Supreme 
Court Payable Accounting decision. Defendant then moved the 
lower court for an order dismissing the prosecution on the 
grounds that the lower court's approach violated the 
Separation of Powers provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Again, defendant's motion was denied. 
At trial, in camera, defendant moved the lower court in 
limine to exclude the testimony of the State's experts who 
would testify that an investment contract was present in the 
transactions described in the evidence. R. 2410. The motion 
in limine was denied by the lower court. 
At trial, the State introduced as substantive evidence of 
the crimes charged against defendant the guilty plea of 
appellant's codefendant Blake Adams. R. 2446. No 
contemporaneous objection was made by defendant's counsel to 
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the admission of tni- <- : imony i ut dtfendart -lairo-:* plain 
erro occun ^ L U adm! -•••i^ '*. 
At tria. *,. nwpr ac 
u]nder Utah security" means ** r. t * 
I ' ijt.t5uiit:t •-^"ostine^* • ^n^ra-^ 
this teqjia, >w^ u u "^^ucu,. 
contract5* meai 1. An investment * money .- .-or 
I ' JtiClb a piOi 
J he p x o l i t i : Fi-nm fhp e n 
another perso «* on te wuctively 
i l L n e e* ' t 
t o.i.t imony m o m luned abuvt- . * <* x
 f *™ * K J - ^ W » <n essei.' *1 
element of
 2 rrime or- an aitexnat) v/e s ^*-,; , permitted 
* " oer se reversal 
is thus required. 
The transactions described n* i ^ evidence h <y~232j 
Sawley ir consideration or their promise that twice the amount 
would be rpturnp^ - * *'" °*>t more than {*n days, rash for cash. 
knowledge ty defend-.' wrong and ot his roll1 iiii 
iui xt>
 ttlere evidence ol il  ' ftnHant " f» 
substant . .bistanr^ in anv alleged wrong, c i in 'liir:,h 
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elements must be present in securities litigation* 
A rational juror then could not find the elements of the 
crime charged. 
5. Summary of the argument: 
A. The information violates defendant's right to 
know and is void. 
B. The statute declaring an "investment contract" a 
security is unconstitutionally vague as to defendant. 
C. The lower court's use of the definitions of an 
investment contract in the Howey and Payable Accounting court 
decisions violates the Separation of Powers provision of the 
Utah Constitution as well as the Due Process of Law provisions 
of the 5th and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. 
D. The admission by the lower court of expert 
testimony that an investment contract was present in the 
transactions described in the evidence was prejudicial error 
requiring reversal. 
E. Instruction 27 denied defendant a fair trial, 
constructively amended the information, allowed proof of an 
essential element of the crime charged on an alternative basis 
permitted by the statute but not charged in the information; 
defendant was thus denied a preliminary hearing; it further 
violated the Separation of Powers provision of the Utah 
12 
Constitution, contained no p l i c a t i o n part that Instructed 
c c o u x u ^ tue eviderr- cuuw < 
permitted Uic jury to deterxu*,^ a question ;.. aw? anr „. 
fact, ditect the jury t, convict the defendant ;* violation *: 
onstitution. 
F. iLw-.i , :ould not have f m m 
essential elements of the securities vi olations charged beyona 
Detail of the argument. 
A. When tbp act denounced by the statute creating 
gei lei: :i < :: t e r lis w h e i :i ai id ' I::l: :i€ .1 :i 01 i ] y , 
must the mforniation go further ii i stating the offense than by 
tno^elv \^ 'n«i * n^ Janquaqe of the statu te Where guilt depends 
speci f:i c :i del :i I: i • 
- e s have un - io rmiy <.-. \>l t h a t an [I reformat ion-
 8»u^v. A.- mm <. 
t h a n s i mp i y r - -pea *~ t h ~ i ^ ng i lage of t h e c r i m i - a 1 s t a t u t e . 
*r .< ti s ] €• c: f c:i : ii iiiii i: :iita] 
the definition of an of tense includes geneixc terms, -: 
snot sufficient that the indj ctment shall charge the offense 
c- . - ^ s as i  i i t:,l :i e ::le fi mi: ii ti ::) i i; t ' ; I: :li t : " ; i s • t 
state trie species, - •: mast descend to particulars. State ¥".>... 
LfcLLli 8fl P I ' if U t a h ] 9 0 6 ) , f ! J S v . Cruikshank, 92 I J J ,2 , 
23 InfcM, >lia illllll/ti), R u s s e l l v , U . S . . 369 U . S . 5 49, • 82 S. C t . 
13 
1038, 8 L.Ed. 240 (1962). State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818 
(Kan. 1993) In the instant case, the information using only 
the generic reference "security" as stated in the statute is 
deficient and void. 
B. The term investment contract is nowhere defined 
in the Securities Act* When a criminal or penal statute is 
involved no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. 
All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands 
or forbids. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U .S. 451 (1939); 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) 
C. The lower court's use of the Howey and Payable 
Accounting court decisions to define "investment contract" 
violates the Utah Constitutional provision relating to 
Separation of Powers, §1, Art. V. It is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct. 
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1990); State v. 
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977). 
D. The admission of expert testimony that an 
investment contract was present in the transactions described 
in the evidence invaded the prerogatives of the jury, Miller 
v. Florida, 285 S.2d 41 (Florida App. 1973); the issue as to 
whether the transactions were sales of securities was for the 
14 
juri est ion o- - u« investment contract was 
?** - ,j on une opi ni on of witnesses 
was competent. Queen v . Commonwealth, 434 S«1". 2c:i 3] 8 
(Kys 1968 i ; 3.A Am.Jur. 2d, Expert and opinion Evidence 
1 
E, I nstruction ?7, as well ac t^e expert testimnnv. 
construct] ve J -- : .-• "onst itutiona , e d t h e «•» 11 * 
v< . • 
has waived i- '- -eni oi • ,*' stai* , * .'.-o. * >. .*v. 
committed to * Mo <-* *-*•**•• t- ,r ., complaint 
chargina one » •>.!.. 
information charging an offen; ulierence iiuiu 
the off>*nr." * . . ,t wr 
informal . .*•- . ----
v. Leek, <9 i ?a I09i. H > ^ * * * State v. Sommors, 597 
P,2d 13 if* ( iTt ^h 197Q- ^on^iction musi ***- reversed it -,e 
COiili, " L* ~ * i - *;i "* * 
enlarge the offense btiirone v. united States 
(I960),, rh^ n^fn^* irm t«i jc i- .
 iV ,^ requirements 
a s s e t . . i 111' i 11 • i ii' I -i i i in 11 
the facts of the case .-y instructions may not include an 
element of aim i it tense if hit elemeni war not charged in the 
indictment it°er v. Stat i nil t-ILB.- Hii I , ,'il ' i"' ml I 11II I i i 
1990) 
F. The introduction by the prosecutor of the guilty 
plea of defendant's codefendant was plain error and requires 
reversal. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994). 
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 
69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) and U.S. v. Krohr 896 F.2d 
1524 (8th Cir. 1990), and Issue VII, ante., p. 6. 
G. A rational juror could not have found the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. There was 
no security; there was no security agreed to be purchased or 
sold. The anti-fraud section of the Utah Securities Act [§ 
61-1-1(2)] is not intended to address fraudulent statements to 
induce a party to turn over funds when no securities are 
actually purchased or sold. Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 
1245 (Utah App. 1994) and John v. Blackstock, 664 F. Supp. 
1426 (M.D.Fla. 1987). Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 
(1979); Flieger v. Delo, supra, ante. p. 6. 
1. Conclusion: The accusatory documents filed against 
defendant should be vacated and this prosecution dismissed. 
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